Skip to content

Apple just proved AI "reasoning" models like Claude, DeepSeek-R1, and o3-mini don't actually reason at all. They just memorize patterns really well.

Technology
330 144 13
  • People think they want AI, but they don’t even know what AI is on a conceptual level.

    They want something like the Star Trek computer or one of Tony Stark's AIs that were basically deus ex machinas for solving some hard problem behind the scenes. Then it can say "model solved" or they can show a test simulation where the ship doesn't explode (or sometimes a test where it only has an 85% chance of exploding when it used to be 100%, at which point human intuition comes in and saves the day by suddenly being better than the AI again and threads that 15% needle or maybe abducts the captain to go have lizard babies with).

    AIs that are smarter than us but for some reason don't replace or even really join us (Vision being an exception to the 2nd, and Ultron trying to be an exception to the 1st).

  • You're correct that the formal definition of a Markov process does not exclude internal computation, and that it only requires the next state to depend solely on the current state. But what defines a classical Markov chain in practice is not just the formal dependency structure but how the transition function is structured and used. A traditional Markov chain has a discrete and enumerable state space with explicit, often simple transition probabilities between those states. LLMs do not operate this way.

    The claim that an LLM is "just" a large compressed Markov chain assumes that its function is equivalent to a giant mapping of input sequences to output distributions. But this interpretation fails to account for the fundamental difference in how those distributions are generated. An LLM is not indexing a symbolic structure. It is computing results using recursive transformations across learned embeddings, where those embeddings reflect complex relationships between tokens, concepts, and tasks. That is not reducible to discrete symbolic transitions without losing the model’s generalization capabilities. You could record outputs for every sequence, but the moment you present a sequence that wasn't explicitly in that set, the Markov table breaks. The LLM does not.

    Yes, you can say a table is just one implementation of a function, and from a purely mathematical perspective, any function can be implemented as a table given enough space. But the LLM’s function is general-purpose. It extrapolates. A precomputed table cannot do this unless those extrapolations are already baked in, in which case you are no longer talking about a classical Markov system. You are describing a model that encodes relationships far beyond discrete transitions.

    The pi analogy applies to deterministic functions with fixed outputs, not to learned probabilistic functions that approximate conditional distributions over language. If you give an LLM a new input, it will return a meaningful distribution even if it has never seen anything like it. That behavior depends on internal structure, not retrieval. Just because a function is deterministic at temperature 0 does not mean it is a transition table. The fact that the same input yields the same output is true for any deterministic function. That does not collapse the distinction between generalization and enumeration.

    So while yes, you can implement any deterministic function as a lookup table, the nature of LLMs lies in how they model relationships and extrapolate from partial information. That ability is not captured by any classical Markov model, no matter how large.

    yes you can enumerate all inputs, because thoy are not continuous. You just raise the finite number of different tokens to the finite context size and that's exactly the size of the table you would need. finite*finite=finite. You are describing training, i.e how the function is geerated. Yes correlations are found there and encoded in a couple of matrices. Those matrices are what are used in the llm and none of what you said applies. Inference is purely a markov chain by definition.

  • They want something like the Star Trek computer or one of Tony Stark's AIs that were basically deus ex machinas for solving some hard problem behind the scenes. Then it can say "model solved" or they can show a test simulation where the ship doesn't explode (or sometimes a test where it only has an 85% chance of exploding when it used to be 100%, at which point human intuition comes in and saves the day by suddenly being better than the AI again and threads that 15% needle or maybe abducts the captain to go have lizard babies with).

    AIs that are smarter than us but for some reason don't replace or even really join us (Vision being an exception to the 2nd, and Ultron trying to be an exception to the 1st).

    They don’t want AI, they want an app.

  • yes you can enumerate all inputs, because thoy are not continuous. You just raise the finite number of different tokens to the finite context size and that's exactly the size of the table you would need. finite*finite=finite. You are describing training, i.e how the function is geerated. Yes correlations are found there and encoded in a couple of matrices. Those matrices are what are used in the llm and none of what you said applies. Inference is purely a markov chain by definition.

    You can say that the whole system is deterministic and finite, so you could record every input-output pair. But you could do that for any program. That doesn't make every deterministic function a Markov process. It just means it is representable in a finite way. The question is not whether the function can be stored. The question is whether its behavior matches the structure and assumptions of a Markov model. In the case of LLMs, it does not.

    Inference does not become a Markov chain simply because it returns a distribution based on current input. It becomes a sequence of deep functional computations where attention mechanisms simulate hierarchical, relational, and positional understanding of language. That does not align with the definition or behavior of a Markov model, even if both map a state to a probability distribution. The structure of the computation, not just the input-output determinism, is what matters.

  • Misconstruing how language works isn't an argument for what an existing and established word means.

    I'm sure that argument made you feel super clever but it's nonsense.

    I sourced by definition from authoritative sources. The fact that you didn't even bother to verify that or provide an alternative authoritative definition tells me all I need to know about the value in further discussion with you.

    "Artificial intelligence refers to computer systems that can perform complex tasks normally done by human-reasoning, decision making, creating, etc.

    There is no single, simple definition of artificial intelligence because AI tools are capable of a wide range of tasks and outputs, but NASA follows the definition of AI found within EO 13960, which references Section 238(g) of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019.

    • Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without significant human oversight, or that can learn from experience and improve performance when exposed to data sets.
    • An artificial system developed in computer software, physical hardware, or other context that solves tasks requiring human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, communication, or physical action.
    • An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, including cognitive architectures and neural networks.
    • A set of techniques, including machine learning that is designed to approximate a cognitive task.
    • An artificial system designed to act rationally, including an intelligent software agent or embodied robot that achieves goals using perception, planning, reasoning, learning, communicating, decision-making, and acting."

    This is from NASA (emphasis mine). https://www.nasa.gov/what-is-artificial-intelligence/

    The problem is that you are reading the word intelligence and thinking it means the system itself needs to be intelligent, when it only needs to be doing things that we would normally attribute to intelligence. Computer vision is AI, but a software that detects a car inside a picture and draws a box around it isn't intelligent. It is still considered AI and has been considered AI for the past three decades.

    Now show me your blog post that told you that AI isnt AI because it isn't thinking.

  • that's very true, I'm just saying this paper did not eliminate the possibility and is thus not as significant as it sounds. If they had accomplished that, the bubble would collapse, this will not meaningfully change anything, however.

    also, it's not as unreasonable as that because these are automatically assembled bundles of simulated neurons.

    This paper does provide a solid proof by counterexample of reasoning not occuring (following an algorithm) when it should.

    The paper doesn't need to prove that reasoning never has or will occur. It's only demonstrates that current claims of AI reasoning are overhyped.

  • When are people going to realize, in its current state , an LLM is not intelligent. It doesn’t reason. It does not have intuition. It’s a word predictor.

    You'd think the M in LLM would give it away.

  • I agree with you. In its current state, LLM is not sentient, and thus not "Intelligence".

    I think it's an easy mistake to confuse sentience and intelligence. It happens in Hollywood all the time - "Skynet began learning at a geometric rate, on July 23 2004 it became self-aware" yadda yadda

    But that's not how sentience works. We don't have to be as intelligent as Skynet supposedly was in order to be sentient. We don't start our lives as unthinking robots, and then one day - once we've finally got a handle on calculus or a deep enough understanding of the causes of the fall of the Roman empire - we suddenly blink into consciousness. On the contrary, even the stupidest humans are accepted as being sentient. Even a young child, not yet able to walk or do anything more than vomit on their parents' new sofa, is considered as a conscious individual.

    So there is no reason to think that AI - whenever it should be achieved, if ever - will be conscious any more than the dumb computers that precede it.

  • I think it's important to note (i'm not an llm I know that phrase triggers you to assume I am) that they haven't proven this as an inherent architectural issue, which I think would be the next step to the assertion.

    do we know that they don't and are incapable of reasoning, or do we just know that for x problems they jump to memorized solutions, is it possible to create an arrangement of weights that can genuinely reason, even if the current models don't? That's the big question that needs answered. It's still possible that we just haven't properly incentivized reason over memorization during training.

    if someone can objectively answer "no" to that, the bubble collapses.

    In case you haven't seen it, the paper is here - https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/illusion-of-thinking (PDF linked on the left).

    The puzzles the researchers have chosen are spatial and logical reasoning puzzles - so certainly not the natural domain of LLMs. The paper doesn't unfortunately give a clear definition of reasoning, I think I might surmise it as "analysing a scenario and extracting rules that allow you to achieve a desired outcome".

    They also don't provide the prompts they use - not even for the cases where they say they provide the algorithm in the prompt, which makes that aspect less convincing to me.

    What I did find noteworthy was how the models were able to provide around 100 steps correctly for larger Tower of Hanoi problems, but only 4 or 5 correct steps for larger River Crossing problems. I think the River Crossing problem is like the one where you have a boatman who wants to get a fox, a chicken and a bag of rice across a river, but can only take two in his boat at one time? In any case, the researchers suggest that this could be because there will be plenty of examples of Towers of Hanoi with larger numbers of disks, while not so many examples of the River Crossing with a lot more than the typical number of items being ferried across. This being more evidence that the LLMs (and LRMs) are merely recalling examples they've seen, rather than genuinely working them out.

  • What statistical method do you base that claim on? The results presented match expectations given that Markov chains are still the basis of inference. What magic juice is added to "reasoning models" that allow them to break free of the inherent boundaries of the statistical methods they are based on?

    I'd encourage you to research more about this space and learn more.

    As it is, the statement "Markov chains are still the basis of inference" doesn't make sense, because markov chains are a separate thing. You might be thinking of Markov decision processes, which is used in training RL agents, but that's also unrelated because these models are not RL agents, they're supervised learning agents. And even if they were RL agents, the MDP describes the training environment, not the model itself, so it's not really used for inference.

    I mean this just as an invitation to learn more, and not pushback for raising concerns. Many in the research community would be more than happy to welcome you into it. The world needs more people who are skeptical of AI doing research in this field.

  • You can say that the whole system is deterministic and finite, so you could record every input-output pair. But you could do that for any program. That doesn't make every deterministic function a Markov process. It just means it is representable in a finite way. The question is not whether the function can be stored. The question is whether its behavior matches the structure and assumptions of a Markov model. In the case of LLMs, it does not.

    Inference does not become a Markov chain simply because it returns a distribution based on current input. It becomes a sequence of deep functional computations where attention mechanisms simulate hierarchical, relational, and positional understanding of language. That does not align with the definition or behavior of a Markov model, even if both map a state to a probability distribution. The structure of the computation, not just the input-output determinism, is what matters.

    no, not any computer program is a markov chain. only those that depend only on the current state and ignore prior history. Which fits llms perfectly.

    Those sophisticated methods you talk about are just a couple of matrix multiplications. Those matrices are what's learned. Anything sophisticated happens during training. Inference is so not sophisticated. sjusm mulmiplying some matrices together and taking the rightmost column of the result. That's it.

  • no, not any computer program is a markov chain. only those that depend only on the current state and ignore prior history. Which fits llms perfectly.

    Those sophisticated methods you talk about are just a couple of matrix multiplications. Those matrices are what's learned. Anything sophisticated happens during training. Inference is so not sophisticated. sjusm mulmiplying some matrices together and taking the rightmost column of the result. That's it.

    Yes, LLM inference consists of deterministic matrix multiplications applied to the current context. But that simplicity in operations does not make it equivalent to a Markov chain. The definition of a Markov process requires that the next output depends only on the current state. You’re assuming that the LLM’s “state” is its current context window. But in an LLM, this “state” is not discrete. It is a structured, deeply encoded set of vectors shaped by non-linear transformations across layers. The state is not just the visible tokens—it is the full set of learned representations computed from them.

    A Markov chain transitions between discrete, enumerable states with fixed transition probabilities. LLMs instead apply a learned function over a high-dimensional, continuous input space, producing outputs by computing context-sensitive interactions. These interactions allow generalization and compositionality, not just selection among known paths.

    The fact that inference uses fixed weights does not mean it reduces to a transition table. The output is computed by composing multiple learned projections, attention mechanisms, and feedforward layers that operate in ways no Markov chain ever has. You can’t describe an attention head with a transition matrix. You can’t reduce positional encoding or attention-weighted context mixing into state transitions. These are structured transformations, not symbolic transitions.

    You can describe any deterministic process as a function, but not all deterministic functions are Markovian. What makes a process Markov is not just forgetting prior history. It is having a fixed, memoryless probabilistic structure where transitions depend only on a defined discrete state. LLMs don’t transition between states in this sense. They recompute probability distributions from scratch each step, based on context-rich, continuous-valued encodings. That is not a Markov process. It’s a stateless function approximator conditioned on a window, built to generalize across unseen input patterns.